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DICKINSON LAIV REVIEW

V.

EVIDENCE

The Act of May 4, 1939,1 known as the "Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act," effects a radical change in some familiar rules of evidence. Under
one of thesc rules, known as th'e "shop book rule," books of original entries, when
properly kept by a party or his clerk, are competent evidence of work done or
goods sold and delivered in the ordinary course of the business of the person on
whose behalf they are offered, including merchants, shopkeepers, tradesmen, mechanics and farmers. 2 The "shop book rule" is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Prior to the legislation 3 making parties competent witnesses in their own behalf,
books of original entries were admitted in evidence on the ground of necessity,
inasmuch as it was frequently impossible for a plaintiff to furnish any other
evidence than that afforded by his own books of account. The book entries were
admitted upon the verifying oath of the party himself. If the book was kept by
a clerk, it was necessary to call the clerk, whose testimony was the primary evidence, and the entries could be used to corroborate him or to refresh his memory,
or if he had no present memory the entries were admissible as past recollection
recorded.
Since the Act of 18694 the party himself has been in the same category as
the clerk. If the plaintiff had personal knowledge of the transaction, his testimony was the primary evidence, and the book entries could be used to corroborate
or to refresh memory,6 or if he had no present recollection, the entries themselves
could be admitted as past recollection recorded, if all the requirements thereof
were met. Since the Act of 18696 there has largely disappeared the necessity for
admitting cntries under the "shop book rule" itself. This necessity would still
exist where a merchant had no clerk and kept his own books and was seeking to
establish a claim against a decedent's estate, or where the executor of such a merchant sued to recover for goods sold and delivered.
In any case, if the books were kept by the party himself or by a clerk, and
the one who kept the books was unavailable as a witness through death, absence
from the jurisdiction or for any other reason, the entries were admissible on proof
of his handwriting alone.'
Under a companion rule of evidence, also an exception to the hearsay rule.
entries made by a third person in the ordinary course of business at the time a
transaction occurred, and of matters within the knowledge of the person making
the entry, which he had no motive to misrepresent and which it was his duty to
make, are admissible in any proceeding where the subject matter is relevant to
'P. L. 42, 28 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) 91.
2
HENRY, PENNA. TRIAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) 122.

3Act of April 15, 1869, P. L. 30.
4p. L. 30.
5Perry v. Ryback, 302 Pa. 559, 153 Afl. 770 (1931).
6P. L. 30.
7
Foster v. Weber, 114 Pa. Super. 101, 173 Atl. 712

(1934).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the issue. 8 This rule was originally one of necessity, and before entries could be
admitted under this rule it was necessary to show that the entrant was dead or
out of the jurisdiction. Later decisions relaxed this requirement in the interest
of changed business conditions. If the entrant is available, he should be produced. But if he has no present recollection, the entries are admissible as past
recollection recorded. If the entrant is unavailable, the entries are admissible on
proof of his handwriting.
The reccnt case of Paxos v. Jarka Corp.,9 held that such entries were admissible only when the following probative elements are present: (1) they were made
contemporaneously with the acts which they purport to relate; (2) at the time of
making, it was impossible to anticipate reasons which might subsequently arise for
making a false entry; and (3) the entrant had personal knowledge of the truth
of the statements. Accordingly it was held that hospital records were inadmissible
to prove injuries unless the foregoing probative elements were present.
The "Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act" provides: "A record of
an act, condition or event shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if
the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its
preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the
time of the act, condition or event, and if in the opinion of the court, the sources
of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission." It is also provided that the term "business" shall include "every kind
of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions, whether
carried on fc.r profit or not."
Prior to this Act, the "shop book rule" and the rule concerning regular
entries were constantly refined and limited by judicial decision and were confused
with each other. The changes wrought by the Uniform Act are at once apparent.
It is no longer necessary to call the entrant himself or to prove his handwriting or
to establish that the entrant had personal knowledge of the facts recorded. Hence,
where the entrant knows nothing personally, but records data furnished by many
others, the entries may be admitted without calling the entrant and all those who
furnished the information. Likewise, under this act, hospital records may be
admitted, if the requirements of the Act are met, without showing that the entrant
had personal knowledge.
This new legislation keeps step with the rapid changes in business practices,
but its real efficacy will depend on the liberality of the courts in applying and
construing it.
Important changes have also been effected by the "Uniform Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law Act" of May 4, 1939.10 This Act is the culmination of a movement that has been going on for the past decade to correct two outworn common
law rules of evidence. The first is the rule forbidding judicial notice of the laws
8

HENRY, PENNA. TRIAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) 121.
9314 Pa. 148, 171 At. 468 (1934).
lOP. L. 42, 28 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) 291.
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of a sister state, and the second is the rule that the decision upon such laws is a
question of fact for the jury and not of law for the judge.
Under the Pennsylvania decisions both of the rules have been strictly followed. There are many decisions holding that the law of another state is not a
matter of judicial notice and also that the law of another state is a matter of fact
for the jury and like any other fact, must be pleaded and proved."'
Under the new Act every court of this State shall take judicial notice of the
common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the
United States. It is provided that the court may inform itself of such laws in
such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid
in obtaining such information. To avoid any doubt that hereafter the matter shall
not be treated a question of fact, the Act provides that the determination of such
laws shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable like
any other question of law.
A change is also effected in the former requirement that the law of another
state must be alleged in the pleadings. The Ac vrovides that while a party may
present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws, yet to enable a
party to offer evidence of such laws or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof,
reasonable notice shall be given to adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise. What shall constitute reasonable notice and in what form it shall be given
will probably be regulated by rule of court.
The Act has another important provision. It provides that the law of a
foreign country shall be an issue for the court and not the jury, but that the court
cannot take judicial notice thereof. It follows, therefore, that it will still be
necessary to plead and prove the law of a foreign country as heretofore, but that
the determination of the question is for the court and not the jury.
Another legislative enactment which might be thought to affect the law of
evidence is found in the Act of June 6, 1939,12 which in section 9 adds a new
section, 730, to the Act of April 9, 1929,13 relating to the finances of the state
government and providing for the settlement assessment, collection and lien of
taxes, bonus and other accounts due the Commonwealth.
Section 730 provides: "Any information gained by any administrative department, board, or commission, as a result of any returns, investigations, hearings
or verifications required or authorized under the statutes of the Commonwealth
imposing taxes or bonus for state purposes, or providing for the collection of the
same, shall be confidential except for official purposes, and any person or agent
divulging such information shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon
llJones v. Maffet, 5 S. & R. 523 (Pa. 1820); Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158 (Pa. 1840);
Tenant v. Tenant, 110 Pa. 478, 1 Atd. 532 (1885); Spellier Electric Time Co. v. Geiger, 147 Pa.
399, 23 Atd. 547 (1892); In re Baughman's Estate, 281 Pa. 23, 126 At. 58 (1924); In re Craver's
Estate, 319 Pa. 282, 179 At. 606 (1935) ; Midwest Piping Co. v. Thomasi Machine Co., 109 Pa.
Super. 571, 167 Atl. 497 (1933); and other cases collected in 15 VALE'S PA. DIG., EVIDENCE § 35.
12p. L. 261, 72 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 503.
13P. L. 343, 72 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 1.
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conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not in excess of $500.00, or
to undergo imprisonment for not more than three years, or both, in the discretion
of the court."
It is submitted that this act does not make such information privileged and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. The obvious purpose of the Act is to prevent
the voluntaty divulging of such information, and giving such information in response to a subpoena would not violate the act."4
The Act of February 11, 1895,15 (since repealed and replaced by the Act
of May 15, 1933,) 16 made it a misdemeanor to divulge records of the Banking
Department. In an opinion by the Attorney G'eneral,' 7 it was held that the Commissioner of Banking was bound to obey a subpoena and that divulging the records of the Department as a witness did not violate the Act.
FRED S. REESE*

VI.

FIDUCIARIES AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES

a. Investments by Fiduciaries
The Fiduciaries' Act of 1917' as respects the legal investments which a
fiduciary, having funds in his hands available for investment, is authorized to
make, was again amended at the 1939 session of the General Assembly.
The section dealing with investments for fiduciaries, known as 41 (a) of
the Act of 19172 was elaborately amended in 19353 to enumerate the various types
of obligations which constituted legal investments for a fiduciary. These new
provisions were set forth in a number of subsections to paragraph 1 of section
41 (a) of the Act of 1917. Subsection 7 of the amendatory act validated investments by fiduciaries in fractional undivided interests in any investment in which
a fiduciary was authorized to invest trust funds. This subsection has been retouched by the 1939 amendment.'
The amendment continues the authorization to invest in fractional undivided
interests in legal investments or a common trust fund of such investments. However, the new Act stipulates that such common trust fund may include a mortgage investment fund containing legal investments and other assets. Minute
statutory provisions regulating the creation and maintenance of common trust
1470 C. J.
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15P. L. 12.
16p. L. 565, § 302, 71 PURs. STATS. (Pa.) § 733.
1713 Dauph. 151 (1910).

*Professor of Law,Dickinson School of Law.
lAct of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, 20 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)
220 PURD. STATS.

§801.

§ 801.
(Pa.)' §801.

sAct
of July 2, 1935, P. L. 545, 20 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)
4
Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 718, 20 PURD. STATrs

§ 321, et jeq.

